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Abstract
This paper analyzes intergenerational earnings mobility in a model where human capital is
produced using schooling and parental time. In steady-states more mobile societies have less
inequality, but in the short-run higher mobility may result from an increase in inequality. Start-
ing from the same inequality, mobility is higher under public than under private education. A
rise in income shocks, for example due to increased returns to ability, or a switch from public
to private schooling both increase inequality. However, increased shocks raise mobility in the
short-run and do not affect it in the long-run, whereas an increased role for private schooling
reduces mobility in both the short- and long-run. That these differences may help to identify
the source of changes in inequality, and other real-world implications, are illustrated in a brief
discussion of time trends and cross-country differences.
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I. Introduction
There has been much recent interest in modeling the implications of public vs. private education
for economic growth and inequality. At the same time there has been increasing attention to the
empirical study and theoretical modeling of intergenerational mobility. This paper brings these
two themes together, showing how mobility can be analyzed in relation to inequality in a unified
setting in which the impact of varying schooling regimes can be conveniently analyzed.
Our work builds on the modeling of parental and public investments in children’s human capital
initiated by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and carried forward by Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993),
Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), Benabou (1996), and Zhang (1996). An important feature incorporated
by Benabou was a source of persistent inequality, in the form of fresh shocks to income in each
generation. Without such shocks it is found that (i) inequality disappears in the long-run under
public education and under private education as well under a suitable concavity condition, (ii)
inequality falls more quickly under public than under private education, and (iii) provided initial
inequality is low the long-run growth rate is higher under private than under public education. With
fresh shocks to income in each generation, Benabou showed that inequality has a lower steady-state
value under public than under private education. Further, public education produces faster rather
than slower long-run growth. While the effects of public investment in education on inequality
and growth are at the heart in this literature, intergenerational mobility has not been explicitly
analyzed in most of the work.
A popular approach to analyze intergenerational mobility focuses on the persistence coefficient
in a log-linear model relating children’s earnings to parents’ (see Solon, 1999).1 However, this
persistence coefficient only tells us about long-run mobility. Current mobility may be quite different.
In the model presented here current mobility is captured by the inverse of the correlation coefficient
between earnings of parents and children in two succeeding generations. This correlation interacts
with changes in inequality and varies in transition. Its behavior therefore requires careful study.
1Another popular approach focuses on the quantile transition matrix of income distribution across generations;
see e.g. Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Owen and Weil (1998), Maoz and Moav (1999), Iyigun (1999), and Hassler and
Mora (2000).
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This paper analyzes the full path of intergenerational mobility in a model where human capital
is produced using schooling and parental time. We show that, in the comparison of steady-states,
more mobile societies also have less inequality. In addition, inequality is lower and mobility is
higher in the long run under public than under private education. The same contrast between
the schooling regimes is also found in transition, for societies beginning with the same level of
inequality.
An important contribution of our analysis is to explore the distinction between long-run and
current mobility. The former is the mobility observed in steady-state. It corresponds to the degree
of intergenerational regression to the mean that empirical researchers have often estimated using
earnings data. In the short-run, current mobility can differ from long-run by an amount that we
refer to as transitional mobility. The latter is positive when inequality is rising toward its steady-
state level, and negative when inequality is falling. Thus the two components of intergenerational
mobility have a sharply contrasting character. Higher long-run mobility leads to lower long-run
inequality, but positive transitional mobility is a reflection of increasing inequality. How current
mobility is regarded may therefore depend on the relative contribution of these two components.
Inequality can rise due to either of two factors in our model. One is an increase in the variance
of idiosyncratic shocks to earnings which may reflect a rise in the returns to unobserved skill or
“ability”. The other is a rise in the rewards to private education inputs, either due to a change in
the human capital production function or a switch from public to private schooling. Either factor
will lead to a period of rising inequality. However, increased shocks raise mobility in the short-run
and do not affect it in the long-run, whereas an increased role for private schooling reduces mobility
in both the short- and long-run. This contrast implies differing time paths of mobility in the two
scenarios, which in principle can allow one to distinguish empirically between increases in inequality
caused by rising returns to ability vs. increased importance of private education inputs. Thus the
study of mobility is not only fruitful in its own right, but promises to enhance our understanding
of changes in inequality as well.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section III provides
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the analysis of mobility. The comparative dynamic impacts of various parameter changes are
investigated in Section IV. Possible implications for the interpretation of observed differences in
inequality and mobility both across countries and over time are considered in Section V. Section
VI concludes.
II. The Model
The model is similar to that of Benabou (1996). There is a continuum of overlapping-generation
families i ∈ Ω, of unit measure. Parents work, consume, and spend a fixed amount of time in child
care. At time zero with given hi0, the parent in dynasty i faces the problem:
Max U i0 = E0
( ∞∑
t=0
ρt ln cit
)
subject to
cit = (1− τ it )yit, (1)
yit = ν
i
th
i
t, (2)
hit+1 = κξ
i
t[(1− νit)hit]α(Lit)β(Ht)γ , (3)
where cit is consumption, y
i
t income, τ
i
t the proportion of the parent’s income invested in human
capital formation under private education and the tax rate under public education,2 νit the fraction
of time spent working (the remaining 1− νit being used in the child’s education), hit human capital,
Lit the input of goods in education, and Ht the average human capital stock. The unpredictable
ability of the child ξit follows a lognormal distribution ln ξ
i
t ∼ N (−s2/2, s2). And the distribution
of initial human capital µi(h0) is also lognormal: lnhi0 ∼ N (m0,∆20).
While simple, the earnings process set out in (3) captures a range of important influences on
inequality and mobility. As in Loury (1981) the stochastic component is an ability or endowment
2Here we treat the tax rate as a flat rate and abstract from redistribution through transfers or social insurance. A
possible objection is that higher inequality will lead to greater redistribution. Benabou (2000) challenges this view by
showing that multiple steady state equilibria can emerge in a voting model whereby high inequality is associated with
low redistribution. Benabou and Ok (2001) also show that the poor may not support high levels of redistribution
when there is the prospect of upward mobility. Introducing redistribution and progressive taxation may enrich the
analysis of intergenerational earnings mobility, but needs to be done with great care and is beyond the scope of our
analysis.
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shock.3 The family has two kinds of influence. First, there is an exogenous impact of parents’
human capital on children’s, which allows a genetic influence. But, in addition to this, there
is a discretionary parental effect via time spent with the child in the home, 1 − νit , and under
private education purchased inputs, Lit. Under private education, the goods input in human capital
formation, Lit, equals τ
i
ty
i
t = τ
i
tν
i
th
i
t, where parents all choose ν
i
t = ν = 1 − ρα and τ it = τ =
ρβ/(1− ρα). Under public education (with state funding), Lit =
∫∞
0 τ
i
tν
i
th
i
tdµt(h) = τtνtHt, where
νit = ν = 1 − ρα as in the previous case and τ it = τt is set exogenously by the government.4 The
assumption of either parental or public financing of education is rather standard, reflecting the
absence of education loans, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Benabou (1996).5 A worker’s
income is given by yit = νh
i
t. Therefore, income and human capital stock exhibit the same pattern
of behavior.
Letting R = α+ β + γ, human capital accumulates according to
hit+1 = Θξ
i
t(h
i
t)
φjH
R−φj
t , j = 1, 2, φ1 = α+ β, φ2 = α; 0 < α, β, γ < 1; α+ β < 1, (4)
where φ1 and φ2 reflect the degree of persistence in human capital from generation to generation
under private and public education respectively, and Θ = κ(1 − ν)α(ντ)1−α. The persistence
(i.e. parental characteristics influencing children’s education) and the community factors are all
standard assumptions, albeit some models use only one of them (e.g. parental factors are not
allowed in Ferna´ndez and Rogerson, 1998). Taking logs in (4) with θ = lnΘ we obtain:
lnhit+1 = θ + φj lnh
i
t + (R− φj) lnHt + ln ξit, (5)
which is of a form that has been used frequently in theoretical and empirical analyses of intergen-
erational mobility. This is a Galtonian process, in which earnings regress to the mean at the rate
3Becker and Tomes (1979) also incorporated “market luck”, which would vary from year to year over the individ-
ual’s life cycle, but argued that it was likely much less important than endowment luck.
4As we shall see the level of τ has no impact on inequality or mobility as long as τ > 0. We therefore refrain from
modeling how τ is determined in the political process.
5Owen and Weil (1998) also rule out education loans and own wage income as possible resources to purchase
education, which has a fixed cost in their model and is only purchased through transfers from parents. Iyigun (1999)
only considers free public education with competitive school admission. The fixed cost or the competitive admission
serves to induce a binary outcome in regard to whether or not a child is educated in the models that follow the
quantile transition matrix approach.
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(1 − φj).6 On our assumption that both initial human capital, hi0, and the ability shock, ξit, are
lognormal, so is the distribution of hit in each generation.
The distribution of human capital evolves according to:
mt+1 = θ − s2/2 +Rmt + (R− φj)∆2t /2, (6)
∆2t+1 = φ
2
j∆
2
t + s
2, ∆2∞ = s
2/(1− φ2j ). (7)
Given that human capital has a lognormal distribution, the variance of logarithms, ∆2t , is here
an ideal measure of inequality. From (7) we have immediately that inequality is lower in all
generations t ≥ 1 under public than under private education, since ∆20 is the same in the two
regimes and φ2 < φ1. Also, of course long-run inequality, ∆2∞, is lower under public education.
Such a difference in how inequality behaves between the education regimes has been studied in
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Benabou (1996).
From (7) we have:
∆2t+1 = ∆
2
∞ + φ
2
j (∆
2
t −∆2∞), j = 1, 2, (8)
which indicates that a fraction (1 − φ2j ) of the gap between current and steady-state inequality
disappears in each generation. This means that inequality converges to its long-run value as shown
in the left-hand panels of Figure 1. Clearly, the rate of convergence is slower under private than
under public education because φ1 > φ2.
Finally, we note that from time to time the intergenerational earnings process may be shocked
by changes in parameters. These can be thought of as resetting the clock to t = 0, and possibly
resulting in a change in ∆2∞ which will initiate a new path of convergence to long-run inequality of
the form shown in Figure 1. But note that the only changes which can have such an effect are those
in s2, α, or β. (Thus technological progress, reflected in κ, or levels of expenditure on education
have no effect.) Long-run inequality is proportional to s2, but speed of convergence is unaffected
6Galton identified processes of this type in his study of the intergenerational correlation of such natural charac-
teristics as height. See, e.g., Galton (1886). Recent studies using panel data and employing instrumental variables
indicate that φj is in the range of 0.4-0.6 in the U.S. See Solon (1999).
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by this variance of shocks. From (7), a rise in α will increase long-run inequality and slow down
convergence in both education regimes, as will a rise in β under private education.
III. Analysis of Mobility
Under the earnings process set out above for both the private and public education regimes,
the joint distribution of the log of human capital in any two generations is bivariate normal. In
this situation a natural, and sufficient, indicator of intergenerational mobility is the inverse of the
correlation coefficient for (lnhit, lnh
i
t+1).
7 From (4) and (5) the correlation is:
rt+1 = φj∆t/∆t+1, j = 1, 2. (9)
Since φ > 0 and ∆ ≥ 0, (7) implies that the correlation r lies in [0, 1], i.e. a subset of its standard
range [−1, 1]. Intergenerational mobility is then given by ψt+1 = 1− rt+1 with ψ ∈ [0, 1]:
ψt+1 = 1− φj∆t/∆t+1, ψ∞ = 1− φj . (10)
Note that there is an important distinction between immobility, rt+1, and persistence, φj . The two
are only the same in the long run, when ∆t = ∆t+1. Current mobility is therefore not identical
to the rate of regression to the mean, 1− φj . This distinction has significant consequences for the
analysis of changing patterns of inequality and mobility, as we discuss below.
It is also worth noting from (10) that long-run mobility only depends on persistence. In partic-
ular it is independent of the level of inequality, or of the variance of earnings shocks, s2. This has
seemingly paradoxical implications. For example, in a society with very low s2 and low φj , long-
run mobility will be high despite the fact that people all have very similar incomes. In contrast,
a society with great inequality, but high φj , will have low mobility although absolute changes in
income from parent to child will generally be much larger than in the former society. The reason is
that mobility, as defined here, is a relative concept. If a large fraction of the variation in children’s
earnings is explained by parental differences, then we have low mobility, irrespective of how small
the differences in earnings are within a generation.
7The mobility measure we define here has been christened the Hart index by Shorrocks (1993), who points out
that the use of this index cannot be seriously challenged when earnings follow a Galtonian process.
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From (10) it is immediate that when inequality is rising (∆t < ∆t+1 < ∆∞) mobility will be
above its long-run value (and that the converse holds for falling inequality). The reason is that
past values of hit were relatively concentrated, and differences in the parental contribution to h
i
t+1
are small compared to those of the random shocks, ξit+1. Over the period of a generation, say
30 years, the levels of income inequality can change substantially. From (9) the result is that
intergenerational earnings correlation (rt+1) may differ significantly from the level of persistence,
φj .
To study the time path of mobility more closely, note from (7) that:
∆t+1
∆t
=
(
φ2j +
s2
∆2t
)1/2
, j = 1, 2. (11)
Thus, when ∆t is rising over time ∆t+1/∆t is falling, and the reverse is true when ∆t is falling.
Hence, from (10) we have:
Proposition 1: As inequality, ∆2t , converges to its steady-state level, ∆
2∞, mobility, ψt, (i) rises
monotonically if ∆2t is falling, and (ii) falls monotonically if ∆
2
t is rising.
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 1. We see that mobility may be temporarily either
above or below its long-run, or permanent level, 1−φj . The latter reflects the rate of regression to
the mean. We refer to the difference between current and long-run mobility as transitional mobility
(see Figure 1).
It is important to note that long-run and transitional mobility have radically different implica-
tions. Long-run mobility reduces inequality both in the short-run and in steady-state. Transitional
mobility is, in contrast, a byproduct of rising inequality.
It is also worth noting that mobility in our model does not depend directly on the levels or
growth rates of income per person. Some studies have found contrasting results. For example,
under private education in Owen and Weil (1998), mobility is higher in equilibrium with higher
output; and under public education in Iyigun (1999) mobility may depend positively on the income
level if the share of resources devoted to education is large enough to offset the relative advantage
of having educated parents. This relationship between mobility and income levels is likely caused
7
by the assumption of fixed education cost per pupil in these models, since more children can
be educated when education becomes cheaper. Moreover, Hassler and Mora (2000) found that
fast growth promotes mobility by increasing the market return to innate ability that is essential
for adoption of newer technology, while Galor and Tsiddon (1997) showed that major inventions
enhance mobility. (In our model, by contrast, technological advance is absent.)
How does mobility compare under private vs. public education? From (10) and (11):
ψt+1 = 1−
(
1 +
s2
φ2j∆
2
t
)−1/2
, (12)
which indicates that mobility is higher under public education, since φj and ∆t are both lower than
under private education. We thus have:
Proposition 2: Intergenerational mobility, ψt, is greater under public than under private education
in all generations t ≥ 1 and as t→∞.
The reason mobility is higher under public education is of course that long-run mobility, 1−φj ,
is greater due to the absence of differences among children in the quality of education received. This
result agrees with the numerical simulation of intergenerational mobility in the steady-state equi-
librium of Ferna´ndez and Rogerson (1998). They found that a state-financing education regime has
higher intergenerational mobility than a local-financing regime; in fact, absent parental influence on
children’ education in their model, there is perfect intergenerational mobility under state-financing.8
IV. Comparative Dynamics
We noted in Section II that changes in the parameters α, β and s2 affect short-run and long-
run inequality. Here we look at how both inequality and mobility are affected. One result is the
emergence of patterns which could, in principle, help to identify the source of secular trends in
inequality. In all the analysis of this section we assume that society is in a steady-state at t = 0
with ∆20 =
s2
1−φ2j
.
8While these results agree with our Proposition 2, note that our result applies in transition as well as in steady
state, and that mobility is less than perfect in both education regimes in our model.
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It is interesting to see the effects of changes in the variance of the shocks on mobility and
inequality in both the short run and the long run. First, as we have seen, the level of long-run
mobility is not affected by the variance of the shocks. However, will a permanent rise in s2 have any
impacts on mobility in the transition to a new steady-state equilibrium? We answer this question
by analyzing the effects of a rise in s2 to s˜2 which happens unexpectedly at t = 0. The appendix
shows that the results extend to the case where the economy is not initially in steady state.
Proposition 3: Starting from a steady state path at t = 0 with ∆20 = ∆
2∞ and ψ0 = ψ∞, the result
of a permanent rise in s2 to s˜2 is: (i) in transition, ∆˜2t rises monotonically, while ψ˜t initially rises
and then falls monotonically; and (ii) along the new steady state path, ∆˜2∞ > ∆2∞ and ψ˜∞ = ψ∞.
Proof. By (7), ∆˜2t+1 = φ
2
j∆˜
2
t + s˜
2 for t ≥ 0 with ∆˜20 = ∆20. This equation has the following solution:
∆˜2t = (φ
2
j )
t∆20 +
[
1− (φ2j )t
1− φ2j
]
s˜2
=
(φ2j )
ts2 + [1− (φ2j )t]s˜2
1− φ2j
, since ∆20 = s
2/(1− φ2j )
So ∆˜2t+1 − ∆˜2t = (s˜2 − s2)(φ2j )t > 0 (due to s˜2 > s2), i.e. monotonically increasing. Also, ∆˜2∞ =
s˜2/(1− φ2j ) > ∆2∞ = s2/(1− φ2j ).
On the other hand, ψ˜t+1 = 1 − [1 + s˜2/(φ2j∆˜2t )]−1/2 for t ≥ 0 according to (12). For t = 0, it
follows that ψ˜1 = 1− [1 + s˜2/(φ2j∆20)]−1/2. Thus, we have
ψ˜1 − ψ0 = [1 + s2/(φ2j∆20)]−1/2 − [1 + s˜2/(φ2j∆20)]−1/2
which is increasing in s˜2. Also, the right-hand side of this equation would equal zero if s˜2 were
equal to s2. Thus, ψ˜1 > ψ0 must hold under s˜2 > s2. Moreover, note that ψ˜t+1 is decreasing in
∆˜2t . So as ∆˜
2
t rises in transition, ψ˜t+1 must fall after the immediate rise. Furthermore, it is obvious
that ψ˜∞ = 1− φj = ψ∞.
The transition to the new equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2. The pattern shown forms an
interesting contrast with Figure 3 which shows the effect of a rise in persistence, φj . The latter
may occur due to a rise in the effectiveness of parental time inputs, α, or as a result of an increase
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in the effectiveness, β, of schooling under private education. ( A rise in β has no effect on φ under
public education.) The effect of a rise in φj is stated in:
Proposition 4: Starting from a steady state path at t = 0 with ∆20 = ∆
2∞ and ψ0 = ψ∞, the
result of a permanent rise in φj to φ˜j is: (i) in transition, ∆˜2t rises monotonically, while ψ˜t falls
monotonically; and (ii) along the new steady state path, ∆˜2∞ > ∆2∞ and ψ˜∞ < ψ∞.
Proof. By (7), ∆˜2t+1 = φ˜
2
j∆˜
2
t + s
2 for t ≥ 0 with ∆˜20 = ∆20. Its solution is
∆˜2t = (φ˜
2
j )
t∆20 +
[
1− (φ˜2j )t
1− φ˜2j
]
s2
=
(φ˜2j )
ts2
1− φ2j
+
[
1− (φ˜2j )t
1− φ˜2j
]
s2, since ∆20 = s
2/(1− φ2j )
The new steady state inequality is then ∆˜2∞ = s2/(1− φ˜2j ). We thus have:
∆˜2t+1 − ∆˜2t =
s2[(φ˜2j )
t+1 − (φ˜2j )t](φ2t − φ˜2j )
(1− φ2j )(1− φ˜2j )
=
s2(φ˜2j )
t(φ˜2j − φ2j )
1− φ2j
> 0, under φ˜j > φj
∆˜2∞ −∆2∞ =
s2(φ˜2j − φ2j )
(1− φ˜2j )(1− φ2j )
> 0, under φ˜j > φj
With respect to mobility, by (12), ψ˜t+1 = 1 − [1 + s2/(φ˜2j∆˜2t )]−1/2, which converges to ψ˜∞ =
1− φ˜j < ψ∞ = 1− φj under φ˜j > φj . For t = 0, ψ˜1 = 1− [1 + s2/(φ˜2j∆20)]−1/2. Thus, we have
ψ˜1 − ψ0 = [1 + s2/(φ2j∆20)]−1/2 − [1 + s2/(φ˜2j∆20)]−1/2
which is decreasing in φ˜j . Also, the right-hand side of this equation would be zero if φ˜j were equal
to φj . So ψ˜1 < ψ0 must hold under φ˜j > φj . Moreover, ψ˜t+1 is decreasing in ∆˜2t . Hence, as ∆˜
2
t
rises in transition, ψ˜t+1 must fall.
The reason that the comparison between a rise in s2 vs. one in φj is interesting is that while the
impact on inequality is qualitatively similar, the effect on mobility is very different. A change in s2
has no effect on long-run mobility while a rise in φj reduces it. Further, the immediate effect of a rise
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in s2 is to create a sharp increase in (transitional) mobility. In contrast, a rise in α lowers mobility
sharply. This contrast creates the possibility of distinguishing empirically between secular increases
in inequality which may be created by these contrasting forces. If intergenerational mobility takes
a large temporary increase, then idiosyncratic shocks may be driving the rise in inequality. On the
other hand if there is a decrease in mobility then the current model says that it is more likely that
inequality is rising due to greater importance of parental inputs.
Note also that a permanent regime switch from a steady-state equilibrium under public edu-
cation to private education should have the same pattern of effects on inequality and mobility as
those of a permanent rise in α or β. Such a regime switch increases inequality and reduces mobility
in the short run and the long run by replacing φ1 = α by φ2 = α+ β.
Finally, note that comparing the original and new paths of inequality and mobility associated
respectively with the old and new values of s2 or φj is analogous to comparing inequality and
mobility across economies that start with the same initial inequality but have different values of
s2 or φj . Given the same initial inequality the economy with a higher s2 will always have higher
inequality, and have higher mobility in all finite future periods but share the same steady-state
mobility with others, as shown in Proposition 7 in the Appendix. On the other hand, the economy
with a higher φj will have higher inequality and lower mobility both for all finite periods, and in
the steady-state.
V. Applications
It is interesting to ask what implications our model may have for trends over time and cross-
country comparisons. In order to do so it is useful to think in terms of smaller differences, or
smoother changes, in φ1 and φ2 than considered above.
In the model we have set out, a pure private system has φ1 = α + β, and a public system
has φ2 = α. We have studied the consequences of moving from φ1 to φ2 or vice versa. A simple
generalization of our model would have a single parameter φ lying between α and α+ β depending
on the degree to which the system was “private” or “public”.9 Other things equal, one could then
9This result can be obtained in a model where the goods component, Li , in the human capital production function
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think of φ as having fallen in most western countries in the 19th century with the spread of public
education, and as having decreased further or stayed low throughout the 20th century.10 In the
U.S., the U.K., and perhaps some other countries it may have increased in recent decades, with
greater differences in public school quality, more private schooling, and increased participation in
the (relatively heterogeneous) post-secondary system. Absent other factors, these trends should
have produced a decline in inequality combined with rising intergenerational mobility across most
countries up to around the middle of the 20th century. In the U.S. and U.K., if we are right in
thinking that φ has been rising recently, inequality would have initially declined, but then would
have bottomed out and started to increase in recent decades.
The predicted trends in earnings inequality roughly resemble what has been observed. In
Europe, while inequality rose during the industrial revolution, at some point in the late 19th century
(varying from 1870 to 1900 in different countries) pre-tax income inequality began to decrease, and
continued to decline through to the 1970’s. (See Morrison, 2000, and Lindert, 2000.) In the U.S.,
the decline in income inequality set in later, but was dramatic from the immediate pre-WWII to
post-war periods (Goldin, 1992). Subsequently there was little trend until the early 1970’s, when
inequality began to increase. (See e.g. Gottschalk, 1997). Aside from the fact that the initial
decline of inequality was delayed in the U.S. until WWII, these trends are as predicted by the
changes in education systems over time mentioned above.
The delayed fall in inequality in the U.S. has an intriguing possible implication. Throughout
the 19th century and for much of the 20th, the U.S. was regarded as a land of equal opportunity
and high mobility – especially in comparison with Europe. Our model indicates that, in part, this
contrast may have been due not to differences in equality of opportunity, but to positive transitional
mobility, due to rising inequality, in the U.S. vs. the opposite in Europe. If so, U.S. social history
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries may need to be seen in a new light.
With the help of our model, observations on trends in intergenerational earnings mobility would
is a composite of a range of inputs each of which can be provided publicly or privately.
10See e.g. Boyd and King (1980) on the timing of the spread of public education.
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make possible some guesses about the sources of rising or falling inequality. Unfortunately, it is
only with the advent of panel data that estimates of this mobility have become possible, and we
do not yet have an indication of trends over time. On the other hand, sociologists have long been
interested in trends in intergenerational occupational mobility, and their results are suggestive.
Blau and Duncan (1967), Featherman and Hauser (1978), Hout (1988), and Hauser et al. (1996)
together document a rise in intergenerational occupational mobility that continued from the earlier
years of the century through the 1980’s.11 The rate of increase slowed in the 1980’s, however, which
is perhaps consistent with the finding by economists that intragenerational mobility did not rise
after the 1970’s (Gottschalk, 1997).
Suppose trends in intergenerational earnings mobility were roughly similar to those in occu-
pational mobility in the U.S. in the 20th century. Then there would be an important contrast
between trends from the 1930’s to the 1970’s vs. those observed more recently. The earlier period
would be one of declining inequality and rising mobility, while the latter period would feature rising
inequality and mildly increasing or constant mobility. In terms of our model, falling φ (consistent
with schooling trends) must have dominated in the earlier period, since it reduces inequality and
raises mobility. Falling s2 would have reduced mobility. On the other hand, since the 1970’s both
rising s2 and increasing φ may have been at work. (Both would raise inequality, but their effects
on current mobility would offset.) This story is consistent with the finding of increased returns to
unobserved ability (see Juhn et al., 1993) and the apparently increasing “privateness” of the U.S.
education system in recent decades.
Solon (1999) has surveyed the comparative cross-country evidence on intergenerational mobility.
He finds (p. 1787) that “...the United Kingdom and United States do appear to be less mobile
societies than Canada, Finland, and Sweden”. While intuition might suggest that countries with less
regulated markets would have greater mobility, the evidence is that it is the more social democratic
countries, with their relatively homogeneous systems of public education (lower φ), where mobility
11These sociologists make a distinction between structural mobility, which would occur due to changes in the
shape of the earnings distribution alone, and “circulation mobility”, which represents changes in relative rank. Their
empirical result is that circulation mobility rose throughout.
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is higher. This is strikingly consistent with our model.
An apparent challenge to our model is provided by the comparison between Italy and the U.S.
Checchi et al. (1999) and others (e.g. Benabou and Ok, 2000) have found that Italy has both
lower inequality and lower intergenerational mobility than the U.S. In terms of our model, this
could only occur in steady state if Italy has higher φ and lower s2.12 But Italy is said to have a
“centralised and egalitarian school system” (Checchi et al.). So why does it not have more mobility
than the U.S., along with Canada, Finland and Sweden? The answer may lie in the fact that
although the Italian education system is financed through taxation and is relatively standardized,
educational attainment is found to be more closely related to parents’ than it is in the U.S. In
other words, in Italy public schooling does not play the role of reducing differences in goods inputs
in human capital production that it is assumed to play in our model. This observation sounds an
important cautionary note. The mobility-enhancing effects of public schooling can only be felt if
public schooling is also more equal schooling.
VI. Conclusion
We have shown how intergenerational mobility can readily be analyzed in relation to inequality
in a simple two period overlapping generations model. We have found that societies with more long-
run mobility, or regression toward the mean, also have less long-run inequality ceteris paribus. Since
in our model a public education regime produces more regression to the mean, public education
leads to lower long-run inequality than private education. For societies beginning with the same
level of inequality, public education also gives more mobility and less inequality in transition.
In the short-run, current mobility can differ from long-run mobility. We have labeled the
difference transitional mobility. Transitional mobility is above zero when inequality must rise
over time to reach the steady state, and it is negative if inequality is falling from generation to
generation. Thus, while long-run mobility is a force for greater equality, transitional mobility has
no such significance. It is merely a reflection of rising inequality. This means that it is important
12Higher φ is needed to explain the lower mobility in Italy, but would, in itself, create higher inequality. So s2 must
be sufficiently smaller to produce lower inequality.
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to distinguish between these two forms of mobility both theoretically and empirically. It may be,
for example, that current mobility has not declined in the recent years of rising inequality but that
long-run mobility and equality of opportunity have done so.
The two determining factors in the earnings process we study are the rate of regression to
the mean (long-run mobility) and the variance of shocks in each generation. The latter can be
interpreted in our model as the returns to unobserved skill or “ability”. Inequality can rise either
because of increased returns to ability, or because of a greater impact of private schooling. Either
will lead to higher inequality, but the immediate impact of increased shocks is to raise mobility,
while that of more private schooling is to reduce mobility. Moreover, long-run mobility does not
change in response to increased shocks, whereas it falls with a larger role for private schooling.
These differences imply that the two sources of increased inequality generate quite different transi-
tional profiles of mobility. In principle, this provides a method of identifying better the dominant
influences during periods of secularly changing inequality.
We have illustrated the possible implications of our model by discussing historical trends and
national differences. We noted, for example, that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the U.S.
showed rising inequality, whereas Europe largely showed the opposite. According to our model
this means that there would have been positive transitional mobility in the U.S. at the time, but
negative transitional mobility in Europe. This difference may have been partly responsible for the
contrast between high mobility in the New World and lower mobility in the Old, which was evident
in this period.
While observations on trends over time in intergenerational earnings mobility are not yet avail-
able, the evidence is that intergenerational occupational mobility rose throughout most of the 20th
century in the U.S., although at a falling rate after the 1970’s. Suppose the trend in earnings
mobility was roughly similar. In terms of our model, rising current mobility would imply that the
reduction of inequality from the 1930’s to the early 1970’s must have been due mainly to increasing
long-run mobility. In contrast, in the most recent period it appears likely that both rising ability
shocks and reduced long-run mobility were at work.
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Turning to international differences, the evidence is that a number of countries with fairly
standardized and near-universal public schooling – Canada, Finland and Sweden – have both lower
inequality and higher intergenerational earnings mobility than the U.S. and U.K., whose education
systems are arguably more towards the private pole. This is consistent with our model. On the
other hand, Italy has a fairly uniform tax-financed education system combined with both lower
inequality and lower mobility than the U.S. We have argued that this is explicable in terms of our
model since schooling attainment in Italy is more closely linked to parental attainment than in the
U.S.
Finally, we must acknowledge the limitations of our model. It is built on simple functional forms
and has ignored technological innovations, progressive taxation, and income redistribution through
means other than public education. Extending the model in these dimensions would enrich our
understanding of intergenerational mobility. For example, incorporating technological innovation
may increase the rate of return on human capital investment and can thus increase intergenerational
mobility as in Hassler and Mora (2000). The effects of a variety of public policies that may affect
the rate of innovation, such as R&D subsidies, can be studied in such a framework. Bringing in
progressivity and redistribution would allow us to analyse e.g. the effects of reducing education
expenditures and increasing transfers, or to allow for the fact that more redistribution often goes
along with more standardized and egalitarian public education.
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Appendix
Letting Λ(s˜2) = [s˜2(1 − φ2j )/(s˜2 − φ2js2)]1/2 where 0 < Λ < 1, we provide more general initial
conditions for Propositions 3 and 4 below.
Proposition 5: Given (∆t, φj , s2) for t ≤ 0, and (∆˜t, φj , s˜2) for t ≥ 1 such that s˜2 > s2 and
∆˜2t+1 = φ
2
j∆˜
2
t + s˜
2 for t ≥ 0, we have (i) ∆˜1 > ∆0 if ∆0 < ∆˜∞, (ii) ψ˜1 > ψ0 if ∆0 > ∆∞Λ, (iii)
∆˜∞ > ∆∞, (iv) ψ˜∞ = ψ∞, (v) ∆˜t rises monotonically from t = 0 to t =∞ if ∆0 < ∆˜∞, and (vi)
ψ˜ falls monotonically from t = 1 to t =∞ if ∆0 < ∆˜∞.
Proof. From (7) ∆˜21−∆20 = (1−φ2j )(∆˜2∞−∆20). Thus, ∆˜1 > ∆0 if ∆0 < ∆˜∞ (part (i)). From (12),
ψ˜1 − ψ0 = [1 + s2/(φ2j∆2−1)]−1/2 − [1 + s˜2/(φ2j∆20)]−1/2 where both terms in brackets are positive.
Then sign (ψ˜1 − ψ0) = sign {[1 + s2/(φ2j∆2−1)]−1 − [1 + s˜2/(φ2j∆20)]−1} = sign (s˜2∆2−1 − s2∆20). In
addition, from (7) ∆2−1 = (∆20 − s2)/φ2j . So sign (ψ˜1 − ψ0) = sign [s˜2(∆20 − s2) − φ2js2∆20] = sign
(∆20 −∆2∞Λ2) = sign (∆0 −∆∞Λ) where ∆2∞ = s2/(1 − φ2j ). Part (ii) then follows. The proof of
other parts is similar to that in Propositions 1 and 3.
Proposition 6: Given (∆t, α, s2) for t ≤ 0, and (∆˜t, α˜, s2) for t ≥ 1 such that α˜ > α, φ˜j > φj;
and ∆˜2t+1 = φ˜
2
j∆˜
2
t + s
2 for t ≥ 0, we have (i) ∆˜1 > ∆0 if ∆0 < ∆˜∞, (ii) ψ˜1 < ψ0 if ∆0 < ∆˜∞, (iii)
∆˜∞ > ∆∞, (iv) ψ˜∞ < ψ∞, (v) ∆˜t rises monotonically from t = 0 to t =∞ if ∆0 < ∆˜∞, and (vi)
ψ˜ falls monotonically from t = 0 to t =∞ if ∆0 < ∆˜∞.
Proof. Similar to that of Proposition 5.
According to Proposition 5, the results in Proposition 3 hold so long as initial inequality is below
the new higher steady-state inequality and above a level which is lower than the initial steady-state
inequality (since 0 < Λ < 1). According to Proposition 6, the results in Proposition 4 hold provided
initial inequality is below the new higher steady-state inequality.
Proposition 7: For two economies with (∆0, φj , s2) and (∆0, φj , s˜2) such that s˜2 > s2, we have:
(i) ∆˜t > ∆t from t = 1 to t =∞, and (ii) ψ˜t > ψt from t = 1 to t <∞ and ψ˜∞ = ψ∞.
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Proof. Part (i) is obvious from (7). For part (ii), note that (7) implies ∆2t = φ
2t
j ∆
2
0 + (1− φ2tj )∆2∞
and ∆˜2t = φ
2t
j ∆
2
0 + (1− φ2tj )∆˜2∞. Combining these equations with (9) and (10), we have
ψ˜t − ψt = rt − r˜t = r
2
t − r˜2t
rt + r˜t
=
φ2j (∆
2
t−1∆˜2t −∆2t ∆˜2t−1)
(rt + r˜t)∆2t ∆˜2t
=
∆20φ
2t
j (s˜
2 − s2)
(rt + r˜t)∆2t ∆˜2t
, t ≥ 1.
Therefore, ψ˜t > ψt for 1 ≤ t < ∞ under s˜2 > s2. As t → ∞, it is evident that ψ∞ = ψ˜∞ since
limt→∞ φtj = 0.
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